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On the Detenninants of Corporate Hedging with Derivatives
Abstract
We examine explanations for corporate policy choices related to the use of derivative
fmancial instruments. Recent corporate disclosure requirements allows us to replicate and
extend the work of Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993, NSS) using a larger sample. We
extend previous research by considering interest rate and foreign exchange hedging separately,
using continuous rather than binary measures of hedging, and including variables measuring
level of multinationality and exposure to interest rate and foreign exchange rate changes. The.
fmdings document robust empirical relationships among corporate policy decisions and fum
characteristics. In a tobit regression analysis, our results suggest that firms which use more
derivatives are more multinational, less liquid, more subject to progressive taxation, less
subject to regulation, and larger. They have more growth opportunities, and issue less debt
substitutes. Thus, fIrms appear to hedge to reduce exposure to foreign exchange risk created
by foreign operations, to reduce conflicts between bondholders and shareholders, and to
reduce the higher default risk associated with lower liquidity. Contrary to expectation,
hedging is associated with lower dividend payouts, possibly due to the correlation of dividend
payout with growth opportunities. Overall, this studyconfirrns the fmdings of NSS that the
determinants of derivative usage are risk reducing hedges.
Our conditional resultS are stronger for hedgers of foreign exchange risk exposure
than for hedgers of interest rate risk exposure. One possible explanation is that there is a
difference in the level of hedging achieved by the use of the different derivatives. Foreign
exchange derivatives hedge the exposure created by foreign investments and foreign currency'
transactions. Objectives for using interest rate derivatives are more ambiguous. As indicated
in the notes to financial statements, interest rate derivatives are used to modify the debt
structure and thus the capital structure of fums. It is likely that interest rate derivatives are
motivated by arbitrage opportunities created by capital market imperfections and transaction
cost differences in addition to hedging interest rate exposure.

Introduction
Usage of fmancial derivatives has increased significantly in recent years. Dolde
(1993) reports that "betWeen 1986 and 1991, the volume of exchange-traded and over -thecounter (OTC) derivatives increased at an annual rate of 48%, from $1.4 trillion to $9.8
trillion." This study gathers data from recently mandated derivatives disclosures to determine
if there are robust empirical relationships among corporate hedging policy decisions and

various fInn characteristics.
Previous research, particularly Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993, NSS), investigated
the determinants of corporate hedging but is limited by availability of data. SFAS 105
(FASB 1990) requires fIrms to disclose the contract or notional principal! amount of offbalance-sheet fmancial instruments with risk of accounting loss outstanding at the balance
sheet date. The disclosures provide a measure of use of fmancial derivatives. Utilizing these
disclosures, this paper provides additional evidence on the determinants of corporate hedging
with the use of interest rate (IR) and exchange rate (FX) derivatives. Consistent with the
recommendations of NSS we extend their study and increase the power of their research in
several ways.. First. we use recently mandated disclosures and are thus able to draw a sample
of 438 fIrms as compared to NSS sample of 169 fIrIns. Second, we disaggregate hedging
instruments into foreign-exchange and interest-rate derivatives. Third, we use continuous
measures of hedging activity, notional amounts of each type of derivative and total derivatives
divided by market value of the firm rather than binary dependent variables. Fourth, we
identify additional explanatory variables which include level of multinationality, and

ITbe notional principal amount is a reference amount In an interest rate swap the notional principal amotmt
of the contract is not exchanged. It is the basis upon which interest payments are calculated.
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regression coefficients that measure exposure to exchange rate and interest rate changes.
Fifth and fmally. we use a tobit analysis that considers not only whether or not a fmn hedges
but also the magnitude of the hedging to measure associations among the variables.
Finns implement hedging by policies that use various fInancial instruments (or
operational strategies) to reduce risk of cash flows or earnings due to unexpected interest-rate
or exchange-rate changes. However, similar to NSS. we define hedging as use of off-balancesheet instruments (i.e., derivatives) such as interest rate or foreign exchange forwards. futures.
swaps and options. to reduce the volatility of fmn value.
NSS interpret the results of a logit analysis as supporting the premise that fIrms which
hedge face more convex tax functions, have less coverage of fIxed claims, are larger. have
more growth options in their investment opportunity set, and employ fewer hedging
substitutes. Overall. the evidence developed in this study confmns their findings.
Using a tobit analysis. we fmd. consistent with NSS, that both IR and FX hedgers face
convex tax functions, have more growth options in their investment opportunity set, and are
less liquid, and larger than non-hedgers. In addition, IR hedgers are more highly leveraged.
employ fewer debt substitutes and are measurably exposed to interest-rate risk.' Additionally,
FX hedgers are more multinational. Also. regulated finns hedge less than non-regulated
fInns.

The fmdings support use of derivatives as a hedge to reduce debtholder-shareholder

conflict, costs of fmancial distress, taxes and risks associated with foreign investments and
interest rate changes. The results are also consistent with the existence of informational and
transactional economies of scale. Contrary to our expectation, we find FX hedging associated
with lower dividend payouts. This fmding is likely a result of an inverse association between
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growth opportunities and dividend payout
We fmd less robust results associated with interest-rate hedging than for foreign
exchange hedging. Our results are consistent interest-rate hedging being used to arbitrage
imperfections in markets to optimize debt structure.
In Section I, we discuss previous research which is the background for this study.
Dependent variables reflecting fInns' hedging policy are described in Section IT.
Independent variables we expect to explain hedging activity are described in Section III. In
Section IV, we describe our data, present univariate test results indicating differences between
hedgers and non-hedgers, present results from estimating tobit models explaining IR, FX, and
total hedging, and compare our results to NSS. Section VI. concludes.

I. Background
Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993, NSS) provide evidence about the characteristics
associated with fInns use of derivatives from a survey of 169 useable responses. They argue
risk aversion provides an unsatisfactory explanation for the observed volume of hedging since
derivatives markets are dominated by corporations and institutions and not individuals trading
for their personal accounts. Portfolio theory implies that, given well-diversified investors,
corporate hedging does not benefIt shareholders by reducing the fInn's cost of capital. Based
largely on Smith and Stulz (1985), NSS argue that fmancial economics offers several
hypotheses to explain corporate use of derivatives. Much of our discussion and development
of independent variables is taken from NSS. They compare the mean values of their
explanatory variables between hedgers and non-hedgers. They also use a logistic regression
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analysis to provide evidence on conditional relationships. Their results are compared with our
results later.
Smith and Stulz (1985) develop a positive theory of the hedging behavior of valuemaximizing corporations. They argue that hedging policy affects the value of the ftrm
through taxes, contracting costs, or the impact of hedging on the fIrm's investment decisions.
We summarize their theory development as we discuss our independent variables. Smith and
Watts (1992) model the cross-sectional variation in corporate policies. They argue that fIrmspecifIc investments result in variation in fums' investment opportunity sets. Additionally,
fmancial policies and regulation varies across finns.
Although all corporate policy choices are endogenously determined, we assume,
consistent with NSS, Smith and Watts (1992), and Gaver and Gaver (1993), that financial and
investment policies are determined prior to decisions on the use of fmancial derivatives. We
also note that regulation and

tax

policy are determined within the political process, and there

exists innovation in both the real investment activities of fIrms as well as the contracts they
employ. Our statistical analysis, however, requires only that these factors be predetermined,
not that they be completely exogenous. Thus, we take the fIrm's investment and on-balancesheet fInancing strategies as predetermined and focus on off-balance-sheet hedging.

n. Hedging Policy - Dependent Variables
We construct three continuous dependent variables. The variables are the ratios of
notional amount of interest rate, foreign exchange rate, and total derivatives to VALUE
(market value of the fum). VALUE equals the sum of the market value of equity, and book
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values of preferred stock and liabilities. We do not consider commodity derivatives in this
study. We construct the variables as follows2

:

IRDERIV

= (Notional amount of interest rate derivatives) I VALUE

FXDERIV

= (Notional amount of foreign exchange derivatives) I VALUE

TOTDERIV = (Total notional amount of both IR and FX derivatives) I VALUE3

ill Hedging Determinants - Independent Variables
We identify variables representing the invesunent opportunity set, financing decisions,
regulation, and taxation. To maintain comparability with NSS, we use the same variables but
consider six additional variables identified in the hedging literature: interest rate exposure,
exchange rate exposure, multinationality, export sales, credit rating, and regulation. First we
develop the NSS variables followed by the additional variables. The Appendix contains
variable defInitions with reference to COMPUSTAT item numbers where appropriate.

Taxes.

Smith and Stulz (1985) argue if marginal tax rates are progressive (i.e., the effective
tax schedule is convex) expected taxes are reduced and fInn value raised by hedging. The

convex region is extended by tax preference items such as tax loss carryforwards and
2Qccasionally, fIrIDS enter into offsettiDg contracts such as an interest rate swap convening fIXed rate to
variable rate payments to neutralize the effect of an earlier swap that converted variable rate debt to fIXed rate
debL Based on the annual reports reviewed to establish the data base for this study, the authors conclude that
this situation is rare, and difficult to quantify. Therefore, we do not expect including total reported swaps to
produce misleading results.
3 If a fum reported only a combined total of foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives, we did not
include the amounts in the separate categories but did include the amounts in total derivatives. Therefore,
TOlDERIV exceeds the sum of mDERIV and FXDERIV for 11 fums (2.5%) in our sample.
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invesunent tax credits that offset part of a corporation's tax liability. Although, the
progressive range in U.S. corporate tax rates is relatively small, fIrms with more prefa?t
income in the progressive range have greater incentive to hedge. Pretax income is considered
in the progressive range and PROGRESSIVE equals 1 if any part of a 95% confidence
interval (based on the variance of pretax income over the prior ten years) around 1993 pretax
income is $0 - $75,000, otherwise PROGRESSIVE equals 0.4 TAXLOSSCF equals tax loss
carryforwards available in 1993. ITC equals invesunent tax credits used to offset corporate
income tax payable in 1993.5

Growth opportunities.
Myers (1977) characterizes fIrms' potential invesunent opportunities as options and
demonstrates that, with fIxed claims in the capital structure, taking a positive net present
value (NPV) project in certain states reduces shareholders' wealth. Consequently,
shareholders have incentive to forego some positive NPV projects. Hedging can help control
this problem by restricting the states in which the fmn would default on bond payments.
Hence, fmns with more growth options in their invesunent opportunity set are more likely to
undertake a hedging program aimed at reducing variance in value. We use two measures of
growth opportunities. The ratio of book value of assets to fmn market value
(BOOKJVALUE) is the fust measure of growth opportunities. The second measure is the
ratio of Research and Development expenditures to the value of the fmn (R&DN ALUE).

4Due to changes in the tax laws since the NSS study. we use a range of $D-$75.000 instead of $0-$100.000.
SOue to tax law changes, the investments that qualify and therefore amOlmts of ITC are less than in NSS.
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We expect a positive association between hedging and R&DNALUE and a negative
association between hedging ~d BOOKIVALUE.

Financing policy.

There are several reasons to expect fIrms with higher .levels of debt to use more
derivatives. First, interest rate contracts are frequently used as a low cost means to adjust
debt to a preferred maturity or basis (fixed or floating). Firms which use more debt are
expected to adjust debt characteristics more frequently with interest rate derivatives.

Second,

more higWy leveraged fIrms have greater exposure to fmancial distress and thus more
incentive to manage risk with derivatives. TIrird, the underinvesnnent problem is more
pronounced with more debt in the fIrm's capital structure. Thus, finns with higher leverage
are more likely to hedge. 6
We construct two variables to measure leverage. LTDEBTNALUE is the average
three year (1991-1993) ratio of the book value oflong term debt to VALUE. Coverage of
fIxed claims is the ratio of the three-year (1991-1993) average of earnings before interest and
taxes to the three-year average of total interest expense (EBITIINTEREST).
Convertible debt and preferred stock can be viewed as substitutes for hedging because
they help prevent agency problems. Convertible debt includes an imbedded option which
makes this liability more sensitive to fmn value changes and thereby reduces the sensitivity of
equity value to firm value changes. Default on interest payments can lead to bankruptcy.

6 An alternative means of reducing the conflict between bondholder and shareholder is to reduce the debt in
the capital structure. However, reducing debt reduces debt related tax shields. ThUs, not reducing debt but
reducing the conflict between shareholders and bondholders through the use of hedging could be a lower cost
alternative.
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Since preferred stock dividends can be deferred, the likelihood of fmancial distress is reduced.
Therefore, we construct two additional variables to measure debt substitution. They are the
ratio of the book value of convertible debt to fum value (CONVDEBTNALUE) and the ratio
of the book value of preferred stock to finn value (PFDSTKIVALUE).
Finns can also reduce the probability of default by reducing the dividend payout or by
investing in more liquid assets. Therefore, we construct LIQUIDITY, the 1991 to 1993
average ratio of current assets to current liabilities (Le., the current ratio), and DNYIELD,
the 1991 to 1993 average of the dividend-price ratio.

Firm size.
Size is measured by the book value of debt and preferred stock plus market value of
common equity (V ALUE). NSS provide several reasons why fIrm size affects hedging
activity. Some reasons indicate small firms are more likely to hedge, while others indicate
the opposite. Direct costs of fmancial distress (Le., bankruptcy) are less than proportional to
fmn size, making it more likely small fIrms hedge. Smaller fIrms are more likely to have
income in the progressive region of the tax schedule, again implying smaller ftnns are more
likely to hedge. On the other hand, hedging programs exhibit informational scale economies.
Larger ftnns can employ managers with the specialized information to manage a hedging
program employing derivative instruments. Also, derivative markets exhibit signifIcant scale
economies in the structure of transactions costs, which makes hedging more attractive for
large flfIllS. Ultimately, the relationship between use of derivatives and size is an empirical
question.
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Multinationality.
Goldberg, Tritschler, and Godwin (1994, GTG) report fInn disclosures indicate that
foreign exchange derivatives are used to hedge foreign investments as well as exports and
other inter-currency transactions.
proxies for multinationality.
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The ratio of foreign sales7 to fInn value (FSNALUE)

The ratio of exports to fum value (EXPORTNALUE)

measures the level of export activity.

Exchange rate exposure.
Finns report foreign exchange derivatives

are used to hedge exposure to foreign

exchange risk (GTG). Adler and Dumas (1984) defIne exchange rate exposure as the
sensitivity of asset values to random variations in the future domestic purchasing powers of
foreign currencies. They argue that the regression coefficient of stock returns on exchange
rate changes is a measure of exchange rate exposure. We follow Jorion (1990) and measure
exchange rate exposure (FXEXPOSURE) as the absolute value of the coefficient from a
regression of monthly stock returns on the change in weighted average exchange rate
(International Financial Statistics Series NED) for the period 1985 through 1992.9 The sign
of the coefficient on FXEXPOSURE, indicates whether a long or a short position in a

'Foreign sales and exports are taken from SFAS 14 (FASB 1976) disclosures. Therefore. foreign sales are
sales of foreign based operations to unaffiliated customers. Exports are sales from domestic operations to
unaffiliated foreign customers.
aJorion (1990) uses the ratio of foreign to total sales as a measure of multiDatiowility. Similar to other
variables in this study, we standardize using value of the fum (VALUE).
9]:t is impossible to empirically identify exposure to exchange rate (or interest rate) changes before
considering the effects of hedging activity. Therefore, FXEXPOSURE and IREXPOSURE measure exposure net
of the effect of derivatives.
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currency neutralizes exposure. Long and short positions are reflected identically however. in
our dependent variable, FXDERIV. Therefore, we ignore the direction of coefficient of
exposure and use the absolute value.

Interest rate exposure.

Dolde (1993 ) concludes that "some current variations in corporate practice [in use of
derivatives] reflect important differences among fIrms in their degree of exposure to fmancial
risks ...." We expect the more sensitive a finn's value is to changes in interest rates the

greater the use of derivatives for hedging. We construct the variable in a manner similar to
Choi, et al. (1992) and Sweeney and Warga (1984). IREXPOSURE is the absolute value of
the coefficient from a regression of monthly stock returns on the changes in the 3 month
treasury bill interest-rate for the period 1985 to 1992 .

Credit rating.

Wall and Pringle (1989) review motivations for entering into swaps. Arbitrage of
quality spread differentials (Le., the differences in interest rates paid by finDs due to
differences in credit quality), may result in lower rated firms fmding a combination of shortterm debt and interest rate swaps to have lower agency costs than long-term debt They
provide evidence that flIl1ls with rated debt use swaps in a manner consistent with an
arbitrage and agency cost explanation and lower rated fIrms are more likely to hedge to
reduce the costs of fmancial distress. However, annual reports of major derivative-dealer
banks indicate restrictive credit controls are applied in derivative activities and their credit
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loss experience has been low. Thus, it appears credit worthiness is a factor in accessing
derivative markets. Given competing factors, our expectation of direction of association is
indeterminate. CREDITRAT is detennined by the S&P rating in COMPUSTAT. Lower
numbers in the scale from 2 to 9 reflect higher quality credit

Regulation.
The nature of certain regulated industries is expected to affect the use of derivatives.
Financing decisions of regulated companies must be approved by regulatory commissions
which restricts

innovation~

REGULATION equals 1 if the fIrm's SIC is 4000-4999 (utilities,

transportation, etc.), otherwise zero.

IV. Empirical Evidence
We requested annual reports and lO-Ks from the 1457 firms in the Disclosure data
base with book assets greater than $1 billion. We excluded banks and other fmancial services
fInns (SIC 6000-6999) from the sample due to their role in the derivatives market as dealers
and intermediaries. We obtained fmancial statements for 517 firms. Of these fInns, 449
were in COMPUSTAT. We reduced the sample to 438 because data needed to compute fInn
value was missing. Other than the exclusion of fmns with assets less than $1 billion and of
fmancial companies, there are no known biases in the sample makeup.
We determine types and notional amounts of derivatives from disclosures in 1993
year-end notes to the financial statements and management discussion and analysis. Notional
amounts were contained in one or more notes for each finn under a variety of note categories.
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Often there was limited description of the contracts. 10 Therefore, we exercised judgement
identifying the categories and amounts of derivatives.
Table 1 breaks down the sample by industry (SIC). The last column presents at-test
of differences between the mean of the fInns in the indicated SIC and the mean of the
remainder of the sample. Fmns in the agriculture and mining (SIC 0001-1999) and petroleum
(SIC 2911) industries use significantly less interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives than
other finns in the sample. Management discussion and analysis in annual reports and notes to
the fmancial statements indicate that fIrms dealing in exchange traded commodities hedge
using commodity related derivatives as opposed to exclusively using the derivatives
considered in this study. Fmns in the utilities and transportation industries (SIC 4000-4999)
use less fmancial derivatives than other industries due to the restrictive environment in which
fmancing decisions are made. 11
Table 2 summarizes the type and notional amount of interest rate and foreign
exchange derivatives reported by sample companies and reports the ratio of notional amounts
to value. Of the 438 fmns in the sample, 182 (41.6%) of the fIrms use interest rate, 170
(38.8%) use FX, and 253 (57.8%) use either or both types of derivatives. This compares with
104 fInns (61.5%) of NSS' sample, 244 (85.2%) of Dolde's sample, and 175 (68.4%) of our
manufacturing sub-sample.. Neither the NSS nor Dolde studies distinguished between IR and
FX derivatives and both samples consisted of larger, Fortune 500, fInns. The range of usage

IOSee GTG for a description of the challenges involved with identifying derivative contracts and amounts in
financial statement notes.

11Utilities and transportation finns hedge using energy derivatives and long-term purchase
commitments.
12

of derivatives is from the maximum total of year-end contracts equal to 131 % of the market
value of the firm to zero.
Table 3 reports univariate comparisons of finns that use derivatives with those that do
not use of derivatives. Columns 5, 6, and 7 contain t-statistics for tests of differences in
means between hedgers and non-hedgers that use either or both type deriyatives. The results
generally support our hypotheses that fInns hedge to reduce the costs of fmancial distress,
avoid debtholder-shareholder conflict, reduce taxes, and neutralize the exposure to exchange
rate changes. The unconditional tests show, as expected, hedgers have greater growth
opportunities (R&DN ALOO), are more multinational (FSN ALOO), use less debt substitutes
(PFDSTKIVALOO) and are less liquid (LIQUIDITY) than non-hedgers. Also, as expected,
fInns in the progressive tax range (pROGRESSIVE) hedge more and regulated finns
(REGULATION) hedge less than other finns.
We fmd no significant difference between hedgers and non-hedgers for
BOOKIVALUE for total derivatives. The ratio is smaller for foreign exchange hedgers as
expected. Larger fmus (VALUE) hedge more than smaller ftnns. This result supports an
hypothesis that larger fmus benefit from infonnation<!l and transactional economies of scale
and is contrary to an hypothesis that smaller firms hedging more due to proportionately
greater costs of fmancial distress and higher likelihood of having income in the progressive
range. Contrary to expectation dividend payouts are smaller for hedgers than non-hedgers.
We employ three models corresponding to hedging with interest-rate, foreignexchange, and total derivatives to investigate conditional relationships. Since negative
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hedging 12 is unobservable, i.e., non-hedgers have values of zero for the dependent variables,
we have a censored regression or tobit mode1. 13 Parameters are estimated using maximum
likelihood estimation.
Table 4, Panels A, B, and C present parameter estimates of the tobit model for each
dependent variable: the ratios of interest rate plus foreign exchange (TOTDERIV), interest
rate (IRDERIV), and foreign exchange (FXDERIV) derivatives to fmn value, respectively.
The second column presents estimated parameters for the model consisting of the same
independent variables as in NSS. The third column contains parameter estimates using all
independent variables. The fourth column presents parameter estimates for a model
containing only VALUE and each other independent variable separately.
For total, IR and FX derivatives (Panels A, B, and C), fIrms which use more
derivatives are less liquid (LIQUIDITY), more subject to progressive taxation
(pROGRESSIVE), less subject to regulation (REGULATION), larger (VALUE), and have
more growth opportunities (R&DNALUE and BOOKIVALUE). IR hedging is also
associated with higher leverage (LIDEBTNALUE and EBITIINTEREST) and inversely
associated with debt substitution (PFDSTKIVALOO). Overall, our fmdings are consistent
with fmns hedging to reduce conflicts between bondholders and shareholders, and to reduce
the costs of fmancial distress.

l~O conceptualize negative hedging, envision a world where a model such as ours produces an exact
measurement of a firm's level of hedging. The higher the positive number the higher the level of hedging. No
hedging takes place if the measurement is zero or lower. The lower the negative nlDDber the more the firm's
characteristics would have to change before it would hedge.

l3Qreene (1993) discusses the censored regression model or tobit model. The application of tobit in this
paper is analogous to Greene's Example 22.9 on pages 695-6.
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Due to the construction of PROGRESSIVE. fmns with higher variance of earnings
will

te~.d

to be included in the progressive range. Since higher variance of earnings could

lead to fmancial distress. the positive coefficient may reflect hedging to reduce the costs
associated with fmancial distress.
Contrary to our expectation. hedging is negatively associated with dividend payouts
(DIVYIELD). This could be due to the correlation of dividend payout with growth
opportunities. FX hedging is associated with lower debt to equity which is possibly related to
the positive correlation of both with size.
We find a strong association between multinationality (FSN ALUE) and FX hedging
and total hedging. 11ris finding is consistent with hedging FX exposure of foreign operations.
Table 3 reports a strong unconditional association also exists between FSN ALUE and IR
hedging. One interpretation of our fmdings is that FX exposure of foreign operations is a
strong motivation for hedging. Due to economies of scal.e of hedging operations and
transaction costs. companies that hedge FX are more likely to also hedge IR. The opposite
case is also likely, Le.• economies of scale encourage companies that hedge IR to also hedge
FX. The correlation coefficient between IRDERIV and FXDERIV is .3633 with a p-value of
.0001.
Table 4 Panels A and B show a significant association between IREXPOSURE and
both IRDERIV and TOIDERIV suggesting hedging is correlated with interest rate exposure.
We do not fmd significant association between FXEXPOSURE and hedging. Since our
measurement of FX exposure is net of hedging. our inability to fmd significant association
could reflect the effectiveness of finn hedging. We also analyze alternative time periods.
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The results (not reported) are qualitatively similar to those reported.
Table 5 summarizes our findings and compares them to NSS. Our results are
generally more robust across different model specifications than are those of NSS. This is
evidently due to pre-SFAS 105 data limitations, and our expanded set of independent
variables..
tax

We fmd less significant association for ITC which could be due to changes in the

law which reduced availability of investment tax credit since the NSS sample period. The

sign of our association for dividend payout ratio is the reverse of NSS. We have no
explanation other than the results reflect the difference in time period and sample.
We calculated the log of the likelihood ratio between the models using the NSS
variables only and the models including the additional variables (panels A, B, and C). For
the IRDERIV, FXDERIV, and TOTDERIV models, the additional variables significantly
increased explanatory power.

v. Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to provide additional evidence on the determinants of
hedging with derivatives. We fmd support for fIrms hedging to reduce (1) exposure to
foreign exchange risk created by investments in foreign operations, (2) income taxes, (3)
debtholder-shareholder conflicts created by growth opportunities, and (4) costs of fmancial
distress. Our results are also consistent with larger fIrms hedging proportionately more to
benefit from economies of scale. Regulated fInns hedge less than non-regulated firms.
Our conditional results hold stronger for hedgers of foreign exchange risk exposure
than for hedgers of interest rate risk exposure. One possible explanation is that there is a
difference in level of hedging achieved by use of the different derivatives. Foreign exchange
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derivatives hedge exposure created by foreign invesunents and foreign currency transactions.
Objectives for using interest rate derivatives are more ambiguous. Notes to financial
statements indicate fmus use interest rate derivatives to modify debt and thus capital structure
of finns. It is likely that interest rate derivatives are motivated by arbitrage opportunities
created by perceived capital market imperfections and differential transaction costs among
fIrms. Thus, we distinguish between interest rate derivatives used strictly as a hedge to
reduce risk of loss due to interest rate changes (investigated by this paper) and interest rate
contracts used to arbitrage capital niarkets to reduce the net costs of borrowing. In the latter
case, the net structure of debt is unchanged by the use of the interest rate contracts. In other
words, the term structure and repricing structure of debt is unchanged from what could have
been achieved directly in the cash market, however, the use of derivatives synthetically
reduces the net cost of borrowing. Therefore, the motivation is to increase profIt rather than
to reduce the risk of loss due to interest rate changes.

Research is underway hypothesizing

and testing the use of interest rate derivatives to arbitrage capital market imperfections.
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Appendix
Variable DefInitions
IRDERIV: Notional amount of interest rate derivatives reported in arumal fmancial
statements! VALUE. (VALUE is defmed below.)
FXDERIV: Notional amount of foreign exchange derivatives reported in annual fmandal
statements I VALUE .
TOIDERIV: Total notional amount of both IR and FX derivatives I VALUE.
TAXLOSSCF: Tax Loss Carryforwards available in 1992 (# 52).**
ITC: Investment Tax Credits used in 1993 (# 51).
PROGRESSIVE: 1 if any part of a 95% confidence interval (based on the variance of pretax
income in the prior ten years) around 1993 pretax income is $0 - $75.000.
o otherwise ( Pretax Income = #16 + #18).
EBITIINTEREST: Three year (1991-1993) average Earnings Before Interest and Tax (#178) I
1bree year (1991-1993) average Interest Expense (#15).
LTDEBTNALUE: Three year (1991-1993) average ratio of the Book value of Long Tenn
Debt (#9) I VALUE.
VALUE: Book Value of Debt and Preferred Stock (#6 - #60) + Market Value of Common
Equity (#199 * #25).
R&DNALUE: 1993 Research and Development Expenditures (#46) I VALUE.
BOOKIVALUE: Book Value of Assets (#6) I VALUE.
CONVDEBTNALOE: Book Value of Convertible Debt (#79) I VALOE.
PFDSTKIVALUE: Book Value of Preferred Stock (#130) I VALUE.
LIQUIDITY: 1991 to 1993 average ratio of Current Assets (#4) to Current Liabilities (#5).
DIVYIELD: 1991-1993 average of the Dividend per Share (#201) I Price per Share (#199).

FSN ALUE: 1993 Foreign Sales I VALUE.
EXPORTNALUE: 1993 Export Sales I VALUE.
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FXEXPOSURE: Absolute value of the coefficient of the regression of monthly stock returns
on the change in weighted average exchange rate (International Financial Statistics Series
NED) for the period 1985-1992.
IREXPOSURE: Absolute value of the coefficient of the regression of monthly stock returns
on the change in 3 month treasury bill interest rate for the period 1985-1992.
.
CREDlTRAT: 1993 S & P Bond Rating available on COMPUSTAT (#280).
REGULATION: 1 if a finn's SIC is between 4000 and 4999,
o othexwise.

**.

# indicates the Annual Industrial Compustat Item #.
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Table 1
Number of Firms and 1993 Median, and Mean Ratio of Notional Amounts of Interest Rate
and Foreign Exchange Derivatives l to Size2 by Industry
Mean
(Standard
Deviation)

Industry Mean Sample Mean3
(t-statistic)
[p value]

Industry
(SIC)

No. of
Finns

Agriculture. Mining, etc.
(0001-1999)

25

0
(.124)

.019
(.032)

-.034
(-4.11)
[.0001]

Manufacturing
(2000-3999, excluding
2834, and 2911)

223

.033
(.680)

.064
(.099)

.027
(2.70)
[.0071]

Pharmaceutical
(2834)

15

.034
(.134)

.050
(.044)

-.001
(.065)
[.9485]

Petroleum RefIning
(2911)

18

.011
(.164)

.026
(.041)

-.026
(-2.38)
[.0242]

Total Manufacturing
(2000-3999)

256

.032
(.680)

.061
(.094)

.023
(2.23)
[.0266]

Utilities, Transportation,
etc. (4000-4999)

98

0
(.470)

.034
(.083)

-.022
(-2.15)
[.0330]

Retail, Wholesale, etc.
(5000-5999)

43

.052
(.200)

.001
(.043)
[.9657]

Median
(Maximum)

0
(1.31)

."

Services, etc.
(7000- )

16

.035
(.153)

.049
(.050)

Total Sample

438

.013
(1.31)

.051
(.104)

-.002
(-.173)
[.8645]

lDerivative descriptions and notional amounts are disclosed in notes to annual fInancial statements. Size or
VALUE is detennined using COMPUSTAT.
2y ALUE consists of market value of common equity plus book value of debt plus book value of preferred stock.
~est of differences of industry mean and the mean of all other fIrms in the sample.
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Table 2
1993 Swnmary of Reported Notional ,Amounts of Interest Rate (lR) and Foreign Exchange (FX) Derivatives
Total Sample 438 Firms
No. of Firms Reptg Use of
Notional Amounts Reported - $ million
Type of Derivative Reported
(Ratio of Notional Amounts to VALUE)
Derivatives ',.
(% of Sample)
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
IR Swaps

153 (34.9%)

IR FOIWards and Futures

13 (3%)

IR options, floors and caps

20 (4.6%)

IR but not clear or combination of above

16(1.1%)

Total Interest Rate (IR) Derivatives

182 (41.6%)

FX swaps

41 (9.4%)

FX forwards and futures

109 (24.9%)

FX options

23 (5.3%)

FX but not clear or combination of above

-

Total For Excb (FX) Derivatives
Combined FX and IR derivatives
Total IR and FX Derivatives

46 (10.5%)
170 (38.8%)
11 (2.5%)
253 (57.8%)

831.76
(0.0618)
846.03
(0.0662)
933
(0.0496)
2164.94
(0.1068)
1052.51
(0.0715)
429.97
(0.0199)
734.23
(0.0479)

250
(0.0376)
246
(0.0323)
221
(0.0435)
959
(0.0705)
250
(0.0389)
122
(0.0121)
191
(0.0306)

7
(0.0012)
30
(0.0043)
35
(0.0016)
20.6
(0.0038)
7
(0.0012)
15
(0.0011)
4.6
(0.0003)

36500
(1.0032)
4204
(0.4525)
11139
(0.1095)
9302
(0.2884)
36500
(1.0032)
8599
(0.0821)
14397
(0.4592)

408.86
(0.0333)
741.10
(0.0427)
830.32
(0.0516)
1921.93
(0.05)
1398.63
. (0.0883)

131.09
(0.0177)
234.3
(0.0219)
208.25
(0.0347)
346.4
(0.0222)

6.8
(0.0009)
6
(0.0015)
4.6
(0.0003)
54
(0.0061)

2600
(0.1821)
8600
(0.3076)
14397
(0.5058)
17244
(0.1809)
45100
(1.3108)

307
4.6
(0.0519)
(0.0018)
ana not.1Onal amounts are alSClosea ill noles to annUal manctal statemenlS.
ource: uenvauve aescnOUons
p
VALUE determined using COMPUSTAT. Consists of market value of common equity plus book value of debt plus book value of
preferred stock..
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Table 3
Differences between Hedgers and Non-hedgers
Predicted relationships among the variables and a companson of the mean values for all sample firms iD 1993.
Variables

Predicted sign of
Parameter Estimate

Means for all hedgers
(JR, PX or both)

T-statistics for differences iD means test
Hedgers - Non·hedgers (H-NH)

Hedgers (n)

Non-hedgers (D)

All hedgers Non-hedgers

IR hedgers Non-hedgers

Px hedgersNOD'hedgers

(I) TAXLOSSCP (Srnil)

+

71.08 (253)

25.24 ( 185)

1.821·

0.212

1.576

(2) ITC ($mil)

+

1.95 (253)

2.19 (185)

-0.271

-0.018

-0.534

(3) PROGRESSIVE

+

0.5 (253)

0.34 (185)

3.404···

2.967···

2.840···

(4) EBITIINTEREST

-

5.39 (251)

10.06 (183)

-1.878·

-2.649···

-1.131

(5) LTDEBTNALUE

+

0.18 (253)

0.19 (185)

-1.151

2.244"

-6.065"·

(6) VALUE (Smil)

7

14840.8 (253)

7282.65 (185)

3.713···

3.113···

3.168···

(1) R&DNALUE

+

0.017 (253)

0.0040 (185)

6.913"·

1.538

7.714"·

(8) BOOKNALUE

-

0.68 (253)

0.68 (185)

-0.01

1.637

-3.016···

0.0084(253)

0.0059 (185)

1.096

0.221

0.613

0.0071 (253)

0.0119 (185)

-2.433···

-1.284

-2.702···

1.46 (233)

1.67 (177)

-2.266"

-3.602···

-0.424

+

0.026 (252)

0.033 (181)

-2.803···

-0.602

-3.156···

(13) PSNALUE

+

0.1645 (253)

0.0519 (185)

8.196···

3.438···

9.988···

(14) EXPORTNALUE

+

0.0206 (253)

0.0147 (185)

0.997

-0.386

1.452

(15) PXEXPOSURE

+

0.324 (245)

0.349 (178)

-0.818

-1.369

(16) IREXPOSURE

+

0.144 (245)

0.140 (178)

0.235

0.661

-0.932

(17) CREDITRAT

7

9.27 (225)

9.48 (141)

-0.550

0.217

-3.368···

-

0.14 (253)

0.34 (185)

-4.684···

-3.090···

-7.213···

(9) CONVDEBTNALUE
(10) PFDSTKNALUE
(II) LIQUIDITY

-

(12) DIVYIELD

I

(18) REGULATION
Variables are constructed

lL!I

defined in the appendix.

••••, and ••• indicate significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Table 4, Panel A
Results of Tobit Regressions explaining the use of Interest Rate and Foreign Exchange Derivatives
Variable (predicted sign)

Parameter estimates (P value)
NSS variables (403)

All variables (326)

VALUE and each
separately

0.1104 (0.0117)**

0.0101 (0.8270)

NA

-0.000024 (0.3115)

0.00004 (0.1587)

-0.0013 (0.1753)

-0.0005 (0.5578)

-0.0012 (0.1674)

(3) PROGRESSIVE (+)

0.0674 (0.0002)***

0.0332 (0.0512)

0.0734 (0.0001)***

(4) EBITIINTEREST (-)

-0.0029 (0.0168)**

-0.0002 (0.8916)

-0.0026 (0.0050)***

0.0248 (0.8113)

0.1485 (0.1165)

0.0061 (0.9236)

(6) VALUE (?)

0.0015 (0.0212)**

0.0008 (0.1288)

0.00076 (0.0124)**

(7) R&DNALUE (+)

1.6517 (0.0001)***

1.5626 (0.0002)***

1.5931 (0.0001)***

(8) BOOKNALUE (-)

-0.0984 (0.1052)

-0.0225 (0.6874)

0.0215 (0.5913)

(9) CONVDEBTN ALUE(-)

-0.0661 (0.8357)

0.0589 (0.8291)

02359 (0.4532)

(10) PFDSTKJVALUE (-)

-0.6502 (U.117)

-0.6806 (0.0538)

-0.714 (0.0732)*

-0.0413 (0.0045)***

-0.0487 (0.0013)***

-0.0245 (0.0404)**

Constant
(1) TAXLOSSCF (+)
(2) ITC (+)

(5) LTDEBTNALUE (+)

(11) LIQUIDITY (-) .

-0.ססOO16

(0.5548)

.-

(12) DIVYIELD (+)

-0.1860 (0.6437)

-1235 (0.0018)***

·0.1751 (0.0013)***

0.4345 (0.0001)***

(14) EXPORTNALUE (+)

-0.1288 (0.3283)

0.0305 (0.8115)

(15) FXEXPOSURE (+)

-0.0222 (0.3471)

0.0215 (0.3892)

(16) IREXPOSURE (+)

-0.0261 (0.6849)

(17) CREDfIRAT (?)

0.0037 (02654)

-0.9750 (0.0262)**

(13) FSNALUE (+)

(18) REGULATION (-)
Log Likelihood for Normal

-0.0448 (0.0549)*
76.46

22.56

I

0.2338 (0.0001)***
0.0029 (0.1696)

I

-0.0700 (0.0006)
NA

NSS refers to regression results using only the variables used in Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993). Variables
are dermed in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Table 4, Panel B
Results of Tobit Regressions explaining the use of Interest Rate Derivatives
Variable (predicted sign)

Parameter estimates (P value)
NSS variables

Constant
(1) TAXLOSSCF (+)

0.0478 (0.3020)
-.ססoo2

I

(0.6022)

All variables

VALUE and each
separately

0.0098 (0.8474)

NA

-.0000004 (0.8714)

..000006 (0.8463)

(2) ITC (+)

-.0010 (0.3098)

-.0004 (0.6715)

-.0010 (0.2724)

(3) PROORESSlVE (+)

.0519 (0.0054)*

.0236 (0.1883)

.0610 (0.0001)***

(4) EBITfINIEREST (-)

-.0025 (0.0594)*

.00008 (0.9465)

-.0038 (0.0006)***

(5) LlDEBTNALUE (+)

.1962 (0.0701)*

.2866 (0.0077)***

.1924 (0.0018)***

(6) VALUE (7)

.0009 (0.1742)

.0006 (0.3079)

.0006 (0.0246)**

I (7) R&DN ALUE (+)

.7657 (0.0563)*

.7423 (0.0890)*

.2103 (0.5313)

• (8) BOOKIVALUE (-)

-.1107 (0.0809)*

-.0490 (0.4018)

.0594 (0.1376)

-.1069 (0.7638)

.1413 (0.6403)

.1604 (0.6208)

-.7593 (0.0557)*

-.6216 (0.1381)

(9) CONVDEBTNALUE(-)
(10) PFDSTKIVALUE (-)

-.9736 (0.0376)**

(11) UQUIDTIY (-)

-.0423 (0.0063)***

-.0631 (0.0003)***

-.0428 (0.0016)***

(12) DIVYIELD (+)

-.4743 (0.2909)

.3148 (0.4387)

-.4427 (0.2441)

(16) IRE.XPOSURE (+)

.0308 (0.6482)

.2406 (0.0001)***

(17) CREDITRAT (7)

.0009 (0.8091)

.0050 (0.0151)**

-.0740 (0.0025)***

-.0357 (0.0744)*

9.468

NA

(13) FSNAI..UE (+)

I

.'

(14) EXPORTNALUE (+)
(15) FXEXPOSURE (+)

(18) REGULATION (-)
Log Likelihood for Normal

-29.428

NSS refers to regression results using only the variables used in Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993). Variables
are defmed in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Table 4, Panel C
Results of Tobit Regressions Explaining the Use of Foreign Exchange Derivatives
Parameter estimates (P value)

Variable (predicted sign)

I

Constant

NSS variables
n=403

All variables
n=326

0.0437 (0.0644)*

0.0074 (0.7979)
-0.ססOO25

NA

-0.ססOO1

(2) ITC (+)

-0.0010 (0.0898)*

-0.0010 (0.24477)

-0.0008 (0.1669)

(3) PROGRESSIVE (+)

0.0375 (0.0001)***

0.0303 (0.0042)***

0.0352 (0.0005)***

(4) EBITIINTEREST (-)

-0.0019 (0.0045)***

-0.0008 (0.3011)***

-0.0005 (0.2329)

(5) L'IDEBTNALUE (+)

-o~1723

(0.0045)***

-0.0653 (0.2848)

-02159 (0.0001)***

(6) VALUE (?)

0.0009 (0.0041)***

0.0003 (03340)

0.0005 (0.0084)***

(7) R&DNALUE (+)

1.1423 (0.0001)***

·0.9408 (0.0001)***

1.5822 (0.0001)

-0.0429 (0.1980)

-0.0090 (.8002)

-0.0436 (0.0953)*

-0.0161 (0.9271)

0.0294 (0.8659)

0.1042 (0.6047)

0.0415 (0.8500)

0.0220 (0.9173)

-0.4190 (0.1057)

(11) UQUIDITY (-)

-0.0144 (0.0684)*

-0.0144 (0.1183)

0.0009 (0.8951)

(12) DIVYIELD (+)

-0.50391 (0.0421)**

-03603 (0.1792)

-1.040 (0.0001)***

0.1777 (0.0001)***

02938 (0.0001)***

(14) EXPORTNALUE (+)

-0.0473 (0.5666)

0.0927 (02471)

(15) FXEXPOSURE (+)

-0.0202 (0.2056)

-0.0170 (0.3285)

(17) CREDlTRAT (?)

-0.0012 (0.5669)

-0.0031 (0.0562)*

(18) REGULATION (-)

-0.0103 (0.4962)

-0.0828 (0.0001)***

109.38

NA

(8) BOOKIVALUE (-)

-

(9) CONVDEBTNALUE(-)
(10) PFDSTKIVALUE (-)

I

(13) FSN ALUE (+)

I

VALUE and each
separately

(1) TAXLOSSCF (+)

(0.4389)

(0.0720)*

I

.0.00003 (0.0441)

(16) IREXPOSURE (+)

'-'

Log Likelihood for Normal

89.41

NSS refers to regression results using only the variables used in Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993). Variables
are dermed in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significant at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Table 5
Summary of Results and Comparison with Nance. Smith, and Smithson (1993. NSS)
Variables
(Predicted Sign)

Tobit

Logit

Constant

NSS
0=169

Replication
0=403

NA

++

IRDERIV
0=326

FXDERIV
n=326

TOlDERIV
0=326

+

++

++

(1) TAXLOSSCF (+)

(2) ITC (+)

++

(3) PROGRESSIVE (+)

-

-

(4) EBITIINTEREST (-)
(5) LIDEBTNALUE (+)

-

++

[-]

(6) VALUE (1)

+

++

+

+

+

(7) R&DN ALUE (+)

+

++

+

++

++

-

-

(8) BOOKNALUE (-)
(9) CONVDEBTNALUE(-)

I

(11) UQUIDITY (-)

-

-

(12) DIVYIELD (+)

++

-

(10) PFDSTKNALUE (-)

-

-

(13) FSN ALUE (+)

-

-

[-]

[-]

++

++

(14) EXPORTNALUE (+)

(15) FXEXPOSURE (+)
(16) IREXPOSURE (+)

+

(17) CREDftRAT (1)

+

(18) REGULATION (-)

-

+

-

-++.

Variables are dermed in the Appendix. NSS indicates results found in Nance. Smith, and Smithson (1993).
+. --. and - indicate the parameter estimate is positive and significant regardless of model specification reported

n

in Table 4 (or in Table in NSS). positive for some specifications, negative and significant regardless of model
specification, and negative and significant in some models. respectively. [] indicates the sign of the coefficient
is the opposite of the predicted sign.
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